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Abstract
We analyze non-cooperative R&D investment by two rms that al-
ready hold patents that they can assert against each other with proba-
bilistic success. The market structure results from stochastic innovation
and patent litigation. Depending on the level of infringement fees, we
highlight positive and negative e¤ects of litigation threats on innovation.
We dene an appropriate regulatory structure of infringement fees that
will implement socially e¢ cient R&D investments in the case of symmetric
and asymmetric patent portfolios.
We are grateful to Lawrence White, Katharine Rockett, Suzanne Scotchmer
and Jean Tirole and two anonymous referees for their comments and corrections.
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1 Introduction
Patents are meant to create incentives to invest in R&D by conferring property
rights, including legal exclusivity on innovations. Yet in some cases patents may
also represent an impediment for innovators. As products embody increasing
numbers of patented components, especially in sectors such as semiconductors
and computer hardware and software, it is often di¢ cult for an innovator to
anticipate exactly what patents she might be infringing. Therefore innovators
face a threat of patent litigation by other patent owners even though they did
not knowingly imitate any patented technology.
The eBay v. MercExchange case in the U.S. illustrates the problem. Mer-
cExchange entered the online auction market in 1995, but failed commercially
and exited in 2000. In the meantime it had led minor patents for online auc-
tions and for direct-buy software. The auction giant eBay had developed similar
tools and therefore contacted MercExchange in 2000 to buy the patents. Mer-
cExchange refused and decided instead to sue eBay for infringement in 2001.
Such litigation reallocates innovation prots between rms that engaged into
similar technology paths ex ante. Therefore it a¤ects incentives to innovate and
a¤ect R&D e¢ ciency.
In practice patent owners generally seek an injunction when their patent
covers a component of a larger product. An injunction allows the patent owner
potentially to obtain much more than what the patented component is actually
worth, because it allows the patent owner to hold-up the production and com-
mercialization of the entire product until a settlement is reached (Lemley and
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Shapiro, 2006). This use of an injunction is increasingly seen as detrimental
to innovation (FTC, 2003; Lemley and Shapiro, 2006). The U.S. draft Patent
Reform Act of 2005 aimed to limit access to injunctions, and called for a re-
newed denition of infringement penalties.1 In this context, in May 2006 the
U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
decision to issue a permanent injunction against eBay. In July 2007 the Dis-
trict Court issued an order denying the injunction and ruling that monetary
damages were a su¢ cient remedy in that case. In parallel, a Patent Reform bill
is being considered in the Congress that would require that damages awarded
more accurately reect the actual harm caused by a patent infringement when
the infringing product embodies a combination of several patented inventions.
In this paper, we study the interplay between hold-up litigation and invest-
ments in R&D, and propose a policy instrument to implement e¢ ciency. We
consider rms that develop innovations in the shadow of each others patent
portfolios. In the absence of litigation threats rms play a standard R&D race
in which they tend to overinvest. But this over-investment can eventually re-
verse as the threat of patent litigation erodes the incentives to innovate. We
use this setting to evaluate the e¢ ciency of rmsinvestments and address the
problem of the optimal denition of infringement penalties. We nd both pro-
and anti-innovation e¤ects of overlapping patent portfolios, depending on the
level of infringement penalties. We show that the possibility of hold-up can
1The Patent Reform Act states that "the Court should conduct an analysis to ensure that
a reasonable royalty [...] is applied only to that economic value properly attributable to the
patents specic contribution over the prior art."
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actually facilitate the implementation of e¢ cient R&D investments, provided
that infringement fees are small enough and the rmspatent portfolios not too
asymmetric.
The paper is structured as follows: We review the related literature in the
next Section. We then introduce the model, our denition of social e¢ ciency
and the decentralized equilibrium in Sections 3 and 4. We study the case of
symmetric rms in Section 5 before moving to the asymmetric case in Section
6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Large overlapping patent portfolios are frequent in electronics and computer
hardware and software, where they form "patent thickets" that rms have to
navigate (Shapiro, 2001).2 This situation results from a dramatic increase of
rms patenting propensity during the last two decades (Hall and Ziedonis,
2001; Shapiro, 2001; FTC, 2003; Graham and Mowery, 2003).3 It can be seen
as the outcome of a prisoners dilemma (Bessen, 2003), whereby rms reply to
patent infringement threats by ling more patents, which they can use as counter
threats. It generates transaction costs and double marginalization issues that
reduce incentives to innovate.4 It also generates legal uncertainty that, as we
2More than "90,000 patents generally related to microprocessors are held by more than
10,000 parties", while "approximately 420,000 semiconductor and system patents [are] held
by more than 40,000 parties" (FTC, 2003).
3The number of patents per million of U.S. dollars invested in R&D has doubled between
1982 and 1992 in the U.S. semiconductor industry (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Graham and
Mowery (2003) nd similar results for incumbent software rms during the 1990s.
4According to an industry executive, new semiconductor manufacturers must for instance
pay $100 million to $200 million to license out-of-date manufacturing technologies (Hall and
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show in this paper, can a¤ect R&D competition in various ways.
When innovation is cumulative, it is well established that the risk of hold-up
by an upstream patent owner can deter investments in downstream innova-
tions (Scotchmer, 1991; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Bessen, 2004). Green and
Scotchmer (1995) show that this problem can be overcome if rms successfully
negotiate a licensing agreement before R&D costs are sunk. However such ex
ante contracts are actually quite rare (Anand and Khanna, 2000), because of
information asymmetries with respect to existing patents (Reitzig et al., 2007),
or on the cost and value of the future innovation (Bessen, 2004; Llobet, 2003).
We extend the analysis of patent hold-up to the case of competing rms that
own their respective patent portfolios and that invest simultaneously in R&D.
This approach can be related to an early paper by Fershtman and Kamien
(1992), in which rms engage in parallel patent races for complementary inno-
vations. Our model is, however, closer to Bessen (2003) and Bessen and Hunt
(2007) in that it takes into account the possibility of patent litigation between
former R&D competitors. Their papers consider as endogenous both patent
ling and R&D decisions to establish the existence of a prisoners dilemma be-
tween rms. By contrast, we consider exogenous patent portfolios, study their
impact on market structure and R&D e¢ ciency, and characterize optimal in-
fringement penalties.
In the literature on patent litigation some papers focus on the denition of in-
fringement penalties. Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001, 2005) and Anton and
Ziedonis, 2001).
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Yao (2006) discuss whether applying the standard "lost prots" doctrine can de-
ter infringement e¤ectively when the patent protects a stand-alone innovation.5
However, this approach does not apply well to the case of multi-components
technologies. Lemley and Shapiro (2006) focus on situations of hold-up when
the patent covers one element of a broader technology. They defend the view
that an injunction should not be applied to multi-component technologies when
infringement was not voluntary, and emphasize the importance of infringement
penalty denition. Our paper complements theirs by proposing a rule for den-
ing optimal infringement penalties.
3 The model
We consider a model where two rms (rm 1 and rm 2) each undertake R&D
investments to develop imperfectly substitutable products that will use the in-
tellectual property that is embodied in its existing patents (and possibly in
the existing patents of its rival as well). To keep matters simple we assume
that rms have symmetric R&D functions: rm i (i = 1; 2) invests

2
x2i to be
successful with probability xi where  > 1.
Each rm holds patents that it can assert against its competitor. With
probability i (i = 1; 2) rm js (j 6= i) product is judged to be infringing one
of rm is patents by a court of law. The probabilities 1 and 2 are common
knowledge so that each rm is able to anticipate perfectly the issue of litigation.
5The "lost prots" doctrine denes the infringement damage as the prots lost by the
patent owner because the infringer imitated her invention.
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We normalize the demand side by assuming that the monopoly prot is equal
to 1 (M = 1) and the competitive prot
 
C

is given by
C =
1  
2
;
where  2 [0; 1] is a measure of product markets competitiveness given the
characteristics of outputs 1 and 2.
The R&D and litigation stages can result in various market structures. Con-
sider rst that both rms have developed a product. The following states of
nature may then arise:
 With probability (1  1) (1  2) the court rejects both infringement claims.
The rms become independent competitors on the product market, and
each of them gets the competitive prot C .
 With probability i(1  j) the court upholds rm is infringement claim
but rejects rm js. In this case rm i controls an essential technology
input for rm js activity (at least from a legal viewpoint). It is thus
entitled to evict its opponent from the market and enjoy a monopoly
position. It gets the monopoly prot M while its opponent gets nothing.
 With probability 12 infringement is reciprocal. Then each rm controls
a key technology input for its competitors activity. A joint-prot max-
imizing solution consists of one rms dropping out of the market and
recovering half of the other rms monopoly prot through a licensing
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agreement.6
Assume rm i (i = 1; 2) successfully innovates, while its opponent fails and
claims is new product infringes one of its patents.
 With probability (1  j) the court rejects the claim, and the innovator
fully enjoys the monopoly prot M .
 With probability j the court upholds the claim. Then the innovator has
to pay an infringement penalty rj to rm j.
The question we address is whether there exists a reasonable, non-negative
infringement penalty ri (i = 1; 2) that leads to e¢ cient R&D investments. By
reasonable we mean here that ri must satisfy the ex-post voluntary participation
and therefore technically require ri  1 for i = 1; 2.
To summarize the above, let ki denote rm is expected revenue when rm
k innovates. We have
ii = 1  jrj (1)
and
ij = jrj ; i; j = 1; 2 and j 6= i: (2)
When both rms innovate the expected prot to rm i (denoted 12i ) is given
6Alternatively, one could imagine that rms successfully negotiate a cross-licensing agree-
ment whereby each of them pays a per-unit royalty to its competitor on the product market.
Depending on the level of royalty, such agreement could yield any prot level between com-
petitive prots and monopoly prots. This alternative way of solving the double infringement
case would not modify our results. For simplicity we thus keep as a working assumption the
case in which rms share the monopoly prot.
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by
12i = i

1  1
2
j

+ C (1  i) (1  j) ; i; j = 1; 2 and j 6= i: (3)
4 E¢ cient investment and non-cooperative so-
lution
We dene e¢ cient R&D investments as those that maximize the expected prots
of a single joint venture company aggregating the R&D capacities of both rms.
This denition is consistent with the standard result indicating that the hold-up
problem can be solved ex ante if the patentee and the infringing innovator strike
a licensing or joint venture agreement before the R&D costs are sunk (Green
and Scotchmer (1995), Llobet (2003), Bessen (2004)). In our model a joint
venture would make a monopoly prot if at least one product is developed. The
corresponding expected prot is given by
JP = 1  (1  x)2   x2:
It is maximized by x = 1= (1 + ). Having dened e¢ cient R&D invest-
ments, we now turn to the equilibrium investments in the absence of an ex ante
agreement. The expected prot to rm i when it invests is given by:
i (xi; xj) = xi (1  xj)ii + xj (1  xi)ji + xixj12i  

2
(xi)
2 (4)
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If it chooses not to invest, it can nonetheless extract some revenue using its
portfolio. Its reservation payo¤ is then given by:
Ri = xj
j
i = xj

1  jj

:
Firm i selects xi (xj) such that
xi (xj) 2 argmax
xi
i (xi; xj) ;
and the rm chooses xi (xj) if i (x

i (xj); xj)  Ri and 0 otherwise.
5 Symmetric patent portfolios
As a rst step we solve the model for an industry in which rms hold symmetric
patent portfolios (1 = 2 = ). Such symmetry can be viewed as featuring an
industry in which incumbent rms have been accumulating patent portfolios at
the same pace over time. Let M denote the prot of a rm that innovated
while the other failed (M = ii). Let D denote the prot of a rm if both
rms innovated (with D = 12i = 
12
j ). We have:
M = 1  r, (5)
D = 

1  1
2


+
1
2
(1  ) (1  )2 . (6)
Prot M is obviously decreasing in  since hold-up deprives the single in-
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novator from a part of her monopoly prot. By contrast it can be checked
easily that D is increasing in , which is less intuitive. This is due to the
e¤ect of patent infringement on the market structure. Any successful infringe-
ment claim transforms a competitive product market into a monopoly. Hence
stronger patents increase the expected payo¤ of the rms when both innovate.7
Lemma 1: There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which both rms
invest so as to achieve an innovation success probability xS which is given by
xS =
M
1 +    D :
Proof : See Appendix 1.
Strikingly, the equilibrium innovation success probability xS is increasing in
M and D. Since  decreases M but increases D, how changes in  a¤ect xS
is ambiguous. Overall we have
sign of
dxS
d
= sign of  (1  )M   r (1 +    D) :
It follows directly that the e¤ect of the litigation threat on R&D investments
depends on the level of penalty r, and that R&D expenditure can be increasing
in the litigation threat.
Lemma 2: Let r0 = 2= (1 + 2 + ). For any r  r0, then dxSd < 0. For
7Note here that the positive e¤ect of  on 2 still holds if we assume that the rms share
less than the monopoly prot in case of double infringement.
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any r < r0, there is a unique r 2 [0; 1] such that dxSd ><0, <>r.
Proof : See Appendix 2.
Investments are decreasing in  when r  r0, and they are inverse U-shaped
with respect to  otherwise. A high infringement penalty r means that hold-
up can deprive a single successful innovator from a large part of her monopoly
prot. This negative e¤ect dominates the market structure e¤ect, and an in-
crease in  depresses investments. This case can be viewed as a free-riding
pattern. Each rm has an incentive to let its competitor innovate and to sue it
afterwards instead of developing its own innovation at the risk of being sued by
its competitor.
If, by contrast, r is small, a successful innovator does not lose much if he is
held up by an unsuccessful innovator. Hence the market structure e¤ect domi-
nates, and a higher  actually reinforces the incentives to innovate. This nding
implies that, for appropriate (low) levels of infringement penalty, the existence
of a litigation threat can actually reinforce R&D investments in comparison with
a situation where there is no legal uncertainty (e.g., where  = 0).
We now examine how these e¤ects interplay with the e¢ ciency of R&D.
Note rst that the optimal level of investment, which is based on an optimal
innovation innovation success probability x = 1= (1 + ), is equal to the equi-
librium investment if there is no litigation threat ( = 0) and rms make no
prot if they compete in the product market ( = 1). It follows that the addi-
tional prots due to imperfect competition on the product market ( < 1) yield
socially excessive R&D investments at equilibrium. In other words, rms start
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an R&D race in the absence of a litigation threat.
Lemma 3: On the assumption that  = 0, the equilibrium investment is
such that the innovation success probability xS = x if  = 1 and xS > x if
 < 1.
Against this background of excessive investments, the existence of a litigation
threat might work either as an accelerator or as a brake. If the infringement
penalty is too weak, legal uncertainty actually reinforces the R&D race, contrary
to what intuition suggests. By contrast, a relatively high infringement penalty
might be su¢ cient to balance over-incentives to innovate by creating a free-
riding pattern. Proposition 1 below states that this is possible under some
conditions.
Proposition 1: For any  2 [0; 1] there is unique () where for any
  () it is possible to implement rst-best investments through an adequate
transfer r 2 [0; 1].
We have (0) =
1
2 (1 + )
; (1) = 0 and
d
d
< 0.8 The infringement penalty
is such that (for any  > 0)
r = xD (7)
, r =  (2  ) + (1  ) (1  )
2
2 (1 + )
: (8)
Proof : Appendix 3.
8The expression for () can be found in Appendix 3.
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Figure 1 here
The gure above illustrates proposition 1. Equation (7) expresses the opti-
mal balance between free-riding and a patent race. It requires that, conditional
on the successful development of an innovation by its opponent, a rms expected
prot from a pure hold-up strategy equals its expected prot from investing ef-
ciently in R&D. To guarantee r < 1, litigation threats must be su¢ ciently
high. As  becomes negligible, both the hold-up and the duopoly rents fall,
and rms overinvest even if r = 1. This implies that a strong litigation threat
might be not only useful, but also necessary to tame R&D races in sectors where
product competition is mild.
Lemma 4: The optimal infringement penalty r is non-increasing in , ,
and .
When the litigation threat is such that the rst-best level of investment can
be obtained, the infringement penalty must be calculated according to equation
(8). Lemma 4 summarizes the properties of this e¢ cient penalty. The infringe-
ment penalty should be low when competition in the product market is intensive
and when R&D is costly, because in this case the R&D race is moderate. Lemma
4 also states that the optimal penalty should decrease as the litigation threat
accentuates. This denotes the fact that at equilibrium the threat of litigation
generates a free-riding pattern rather than additional incentives to innovate. In
this context, and as indicated in equation (7), the probability of infringement
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and the infringement penalty substitute for each other to maintain the optimal
level of expected hold-up prot.
6 Asymmetric patent portfolios
Assume now that rms hold asymmetric patent portfolios (1 6= 2). Following
our interpretation of patent portfolios as resulting from the rms histories,
we describe the asymmetric portfolio case as representing an incumbent (with
the larger portfolio of patents) and a competitor that entered the industry more
recently. Without loss of generality, let rm 1 refer to the rm holding a stronger
portfolio (1 > 2). Let r be the share of a single innovators prot left to her
opponent in the event of a successful infringement claim. Two outcomes can
arise in equilibrium depending on whether the parameters 1; 2,  and r satisfy
the inequality given below:
22
22 + 
1
2   122
>
11

: (9)
Lemma 5: For each given values of the parameters 1; 2,  and r the
equilibrium is unique. It such that both rms invest in R&D if and only if (9)
holds. Otherwise it is such that only rm 1 invests in R&D.
Proof : See Appendix 4.
The inequality (9) does not hold when 1r ! 1 and  is su¢ ciently high.
16
Two di¢ culties arise under asymmetric portfolios. First they induce asym-
metric investment strategies even though the rms have identical R&D func-
tions. Since e¢ ciency requires that both rms invest the same amount, this
is a factor of ine¢ ciency. Moreover, strongly asymmetric portfolios can com-
pletely dissuade the rm with a weak portfolio from undertaking R&D. Then
the portfolio works as a barrier to entry.
Proposition 2: Provided discrimination is possible, setting r1 and r

2 such
that:
ir

i = x


12i +

   1 [j   i]

(10)
, ri =
12j   12i
i
 
2   1 ; i; j = 1; 2 i 6= j; (11)
implements an e¢ cient equilibrium.
The values r1 and r

2 are such that r

1 < r

2 and such that the rm with the
weakest portfolio has greater expected monopoly rents.
Proof : The e¢ cient investment forms a pooling equilibrium if and only if
it solves both best response functions:
8>><>>:
x = (1  2r2)  x

1  2r2 + 1r1   121

;
x = (1  1r1)  x

1  1r1 + 2r2   122

:
Solving for r1 and r2 leads to (11). The proof of the second point is straightforward.
The infringement fees that restore R&D e¢ ciency are comparable with the
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optimal fee of Proposition 1. Although they are now di¤erent for each rm,
they are similarly decreasing with the strength of the litigators portfolio, the
cost of R&D, and the intensity of market competition.
The expected rent of a patent holder depends once again on the duopoly
prots that each rm would make, except that it is now corrected by the dif-
ference in the strength of the two rmsproperty rights. As in the symmetric
case, the optimal penalty should decrease as the litigation threat accentuates.
This implies that the rm with the stronger portfolio gets less than its expected
duopoly prots conditional on investing e¢ ciently while the rm with the weak-
est portfolio gets more. The amount added or deducted from the duopoly rents
is proportional and inversely correlated to the cost of R&D ().
Since we must have ri 2 [0; 1], the parameters (1; 2) for which r1 and r2
are well dened are such that i 2 [L (j) ; U(j)] with
U(j) =
2j + (   1) (1  ) (1  j)
1 +     (   1) (1  j)
and
L(j) =
2j + (   1) (1  ) (1  j)
22 +    1   (   1) (1  j)
for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i. It is obvious that these boundaries dene a non-empty
interval. Appendix 5 analyzes the functions U() and L() in greater detail.
Figure 2 (below) gives a visual representation of the interval where 1 and 2
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must lie for an e¢ cient equilibrium to exist.
Figure 2 here
It clearly shows that even with discriminatory fees, e¢ ciency cannot be
reached when the patent portfolios are strongly asymmetric. Put di¤erently,
the e¢ ciency result obtained for symmetric portfolios is robust only to the
introduction of limited asymmetries, on the condition that fees can be tailored
as a function of each rms portfolio.
7 Conclusion
The threat of patent hold-up is generally deemed as an impediment to innovation
in some industries. In this paper we investigate whether it can be used to
balance socially excessive investments when two rms compete in R&D under
the reciprocal threat of patent litigation. We consider a situation where the
market structure is determined successively by the probabilistic outcomes of
R&D and patent litigation. In this context we characterize infringement fees
that allow e¢ cient R&D investments in the overall R&D game.
Depending on the level of infringement fees, we nd that the reciprocal threat
of patent hold-up can either reinforce incentives to innovate or reduce total R&D
investments. The rst e¤ect is due to the positive impact of patent litigation
on industry concentration. It dominates when infringement fees are low. As
infringement fees increase, it is outweighed by the risk that an innovator will
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be deprived of part of its prots by an opportunistic patent holder. In this case
the reciprocal threat of hold-up creates a free-riding pattern whereby each rm
prefers to let its competitor develop an innovation and then sue it.
We show that optimal R&D investment can be implemented by tuning the
infringement fees so that the free-riding e¤ect dominates. This solution can be
implemented under some conditions, namely when infringement is su¢ ciently
likely and when portfolios are close to symmetric.
High infringement probabilities facilitate the implementation of e¢ cient R&D
investments because they increase the investmentssensitivity to the infringe-
ment fee. Since both infringement likelihood and infringement fees then reduce
incentives to innovate, maintaining the correct level of incentives requires that
infringement fees be decreasing in the strength of the infringed patent portfo-
lio. When patent portfolios are symmetric across the industry, this implies that
infringement royalties should be lower when the patent portfolios overlap to a
greater extent. We nd that this result can be extended to weakly asymmetric
portfolios on the condition that the fees can be di¤erentiated. However, when
the patent portfolios are strongly asymmetric, there is no reasonable fee that
can implement e¢ ciency. The rm with the stronger portfolio therefore invests
excessively and deters its competitor.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1
The reaction functions are given by
xi(xj) = max

M   xj (1  D)

; 0

; (12)
i = 1; 2 and j 6= i.
The reaction functions are downward sloping since (1  D) > 0. Moreover,
since
M

<
M
1  D no asymmetric equilibrium in which a rm invests
M

while the other invests 0 is possible. The best reply functions cross once and
the symmetric equilibrium described in the proposition is unique. In addition,
plugging back the best reply into rm i0s prot leads to
max
xi
i = iR +

2
[xi (xj)]
2
> iR:
Thus the participation constraints holds strictly.
Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 2
Claim: Given any  2 [0; 1], there exists a unique r such that dx
s
d
>
<
0 ,
r
<
>
r:We have
dr
d
< 0.
Proof: The sign of
dxs
d
is given by the following function:
F (r; ) =  (1  )M   r (1 +    D) :
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We have
F (0; ) =  (1  )  0
and
F (1; ) =  (1  )2   (1 + ) + D < 0;
since D < 12 and (1 + )  2. The function F (:) is continuous in r: Thus for
each  there exists at least one r such that F (r; ) = 0. Finally since
@F
@r
= D    (1  )  (1 + ) < 0;
r is unique. Since
@F
@
=  M < 0 we have dr
d
=  
@F
@
@F
@r

r=r
< 0. Thus
r() < r(0)  r0.
Consequently, the above one-to-one relationship implies that for any given
r < r0 there exists a unique r such that
dxs
d
>
<
0, <
>
r.
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1.
It is possible to implement the socially e¢ cient investment associated with
the innovation success probability xS = x if and only if there exists a unique
r 2 [0; 1] that satises
 (1 + ) r = 

1  
2

+
(1  )
2
(1  )2 : (13)
We have an equality of the form Ar = B where A and B are non-negative.
Hence r is non-negative. All that remains is to identify the set of parameters
22
(; ) such that r  1. Consider the following function
F (; ) = 

1  
2

+ (1  )2 (1  )
2
   (1 + ) :
There exists a unique r  1; implementing socially e¢ cient investments, if and
only if the parameters  and  are such that F (; )  0. We have
F (0; )  0
and
F (1; ) < 0:
Since
@F
@
< 0, there exists a unique  () such that F ( () ; )  0 and such
that F (; )  0 for all   ():
Specically we have
 () =
q
( + 1  )2 +  (1  )  ( + 1  )

8 > 0
and  (0) = 12(+1) . Finally, since
@F
@
< 0, we have
d
d
< 0.
Appendix 4: Proof of Lemma 5
In the asymmetric case, the reaction curves are given by
x1 = 
1
1   x2S1 (1; 2) (14)
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and
x2 = 
2
2   x1S2 (2; 1) (15)
where
Si (i; j) = 
i
i + 
j
i   12i :
and where ji and 
12
i i; j = 1; 2 are dened by (1), (2), and (3). To establish
the results stated in Lemma 5 we proceed as follows: First we show that the
reaction functions are downward sloping. Second, we show that if there is an
interior solution, it is unique. We fully characterize it. Last we show that there
exists congurations of parameters such that x2 = 0 in equilibrium.
 The reaction functions are downward sloping.
It is straightforward to verify that S1 (1; 2)  0 so that the rst reaction
function is downward sloping. For any given j (j = 1; 2) S2(:; :) is linear in i.
Let a = 12 (1   (1  2)) and b = 12 (1 +  (1  1)). For r 2 [0; a], we have
@S2
@2
< 0; @S2@1 > 0 and thus
S2 (2; 1) > S2 (2; 2) > 0:
For r 2 [a; b], we have @S2
@2
< 0;
@S2
@1
< 0 and therefore S2 (2; 1) > S2 (1; 1) >
0. Finally for r 2 [b; 1], we have @S2
@2
> 0;
@S2
@1
< 0 and thus S2 (2; 1) >
S2 (0; 1) > 0. Thus we always have S2 (2; 1) > 0 so that the second reaction
function is also downward sloping.
 If interior, the solution is unique.
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Consider a situation where we have
11
11 + 
2
1   121
>
22

and
22
22 + 
1
2   122
>
11

:
In that case, there is at least one interior equilibrium. In equilibrium (15) and
(14) hold so that
x2 =
11
S1 (1; 2)
  x1S2 (2; 1)

:
and
x2 =
22

  x1S2 (2; 1)

:
Firm 1s reaction function is steeper than rm 2s (when setting x2 on the
vertical axis) since
2 > S1 (1; 2)S2 (2; 1) :
9
Therefore, any equilibrium where x1 > 0 and x2 > 0 is unique. Let xASi denote
rm i0 s innovation success probability, we have
xASi =
ii   jj
h
ii + 
j
i   12i
i
2  
h
ii + 
j
i   12i
i h
jj + 
i
j   12j
i ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j;
where ji and 
12
i i; j = 1; 2 are dened by (1), (2), and (3). Plugging back the
reaction function into a rms prot leads to
max
xi
i = iR +

2
[xi (xj)]
2
> iR for i = 1; 2:
9 Indeed, we have S1 (1; 2)S2 (2; 1) < 1  (1r1   2r2)2 < 1 and  > 1.
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Thus the participation constraint is satised.
 For some values of the exogenous parameters, the equilibrium is such that
x2 = 0. However we always have x1 > 0.
Since
11
11 + 
2
1   121
>
22

there is no equilibrium with x1 = 0.
To guarantee that the reaction curves cross at a point where x2 > 0 we must
have
22
22 + 
1
2   122
>
11

:
Depending on the values of 1, 2,  and r the above inequality may or may not
hold. For instance let 1 = 1, 2 = 0:5, r = 0:98 and  = 1. For any  > 6:7 we
have x2 > 0 in equilibrium and for any   6:7 we have x2 = 0 in equilibrium.
Appendix 5: Analysis of the functions U() and L().
It is obvious to show that U () > L (). We have
sign of
dU
d
= 2 + (1  ) + 2(1 + ) > 0:
Then U(0) > 0 and
U () >  , (   1)
h
1   (1  )2
i
> 0:
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We have
sign of
dL
d
= 2 (4   (1  ) (2 + 1)) + (1  )  42   1 > 0:
Then L(0) > 0 and there exists a unique 0 such that L(0) = 0. The former
result can be established considering that L() =  if and only if
2 +    (1  )  (1  ) = 0:
The left-hand side is an increasing function so that only one 0 solves the equal-
ity. Figure 2, in the text, summarizes the above ndings.
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